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Perspectives of Students
at Estonian Universities on PostSoviet Estonia's Independence
and Democracy
Raivo Veti.k
University of Tartu (Estonia)

J. David Gillespie
Presbyterian College (USA)
In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba contended that
effective democratic practice is sustained when an allegiant relationship
exists between democratic processes and an inclusive, pluralistic,
participatory political culture (i.e., a civic culture). Empirical research
done in Estonia late in the Soviet period and in the years following the
J991 Soviet collapse revealed, first , a troubling legacy of animosity and
resentment separating ethnic Estonians both from Russia and from the
large Russian ethnic minority residing in Estonia, but, second, hopeful
signs of the movement of public attitudes in the direction of reconciliation
and inclusiveness as essential elements of emerging civic culture.
In this study, conducted in the sixth year in the life of post-Soviet
Estonia, we examine perceptions of the renewed nation 's educated
y oung. We sought respondents ' attitudes toward independent Estonia and
evidence of the presence of inclusive democratic values that would
confinn the successful ongoing emergence of civic culture.
The focus of our research was upon university students; that is,
y oung future opinion leaders and holders of positions of influence in the
public and private spheres of post-Soviet Estonian society. Using Q
methodology , we asked students at three Estonian institutions of higher
education to produce Q-sorts rank-ordering their reactions to 52
subjective statements on a forced-distribution scale. The respondent pool
included ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians. The data they offered

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the
South Carolina Political Science Associati on.
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were factor-analyzed to isolate and identify discrete "factors ," i.e.,
perspectives held by university students about Estonia's independence
and democracy.
We derive four factors : Efficacious Enterprisers, Detached
Naysayers, Estonia-first Welfarists, and Cosmopolitan Bridgers. The
clearest, most logical inference from the data is a positive forecast for
Estonia, for effective democratic processes sustained by an inclusive,
participatory civic culture. This was especially found in the shared
response across factor lines on certain fundamental values: praise of
Russian language and culture, resolute optimism about Estonia 's future ,
and disinclination to blame Estonia's Russians for past Soviet misdeeds.

E

stonia poses a poignant case study of the transformation of
values, accompanying the economic, social, and political
changes, in post-Soviet Eastern Europe. It is not that the
nation has extraordinary economic and political importance; with an
area of some 17,500 square miles and 1.5 million people (less than
the combined areas of New Hampshire and V ennont and a
population slightly larger than that of Maine), Estonia ranks
thirteenth in territory and last in population among the fifteen nowindependent nations that were union republics before the collapse of
the U.S.S.R Estonia's significance as a case study lies in the
ongoing success of its transformation. The most prosperous per
capita of the former Soviet republics, Estonia, by virtually any
measure, is thriving as the twenty-first century approaches.
In a now-classic 1960s work which combined democratic
theory with empirical research in five western nations, Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba contended that an inclusive participatory
civic culture is vital in undergirding effective democratic processes
(1963). Challengers would successfully debunk the concept of civic
culture as an always-necessary prerequisite to successful democratic
performance (see Almond and Verba 1989). Even so, few woul d
deny that, when present, civic culture is a powerful impetus for
democratic practice . Now there is convincing evidence, much of it
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revealed or substantiated in the present study, that Estonia is well on
its way toward developing a civic culture .
Our own optimism for free Estonia , resolute though it is, is
tempered somewhat by the well-documented record of inequity ,
hardship , corruption , even failure associated with the movement
toward economic and political liberalization in Eastern Europe and
in the Third World in the 1990s (see Ramet 1996, Barber 1996,
Unger 1994, Dresner 1996, Chomsky 1994, Thurow 1995,
Schlesinger 1997, and Hausmann 1997). A burgeoning literature in
democratic theory conveys the contention that the relationship
between capitalism and democracy is one of tension if not mutual
exclusivity. Although some of this takes the form of leftist
nostalgia, much of it comes from exponents of robust
democracy-of
"strong democracy" (Barber 1984 and 1996) of
"discursive democracy" (Dryzek, 1990 and 1996)1-who are prone
to criticize both the minimalist assumptions of recent "empirical"
democratic theory and the rationalist theory of public choice .
Estonia continues to face its own specific and substantial
problems in the evolution of its democratic values. Many Estonians
still profess fear of neighboring Russia, dominant over Estonian
affairs for most of three centuries and now suffering psychic
humiliation from events surrounding and subsequent to the Soviet
demise. The tardiness of Russian troop withdrawal from
independent Estonia (together with episodes of excess carried out
by withdrawing troops) and a Russian-Estonian boundary dispute in

1

Dryzek praises Q methodology , the same methodology utilized in the present
study . Q, Dryzek contends, is itse lf" discursive ," empowering respondents to create and
register their own perspecti ves with regard to a top ic or issue . Dryzek has conducted
"discourses" (Q studies) in Australia and the U.S., and currently he is do ing such research
in many of the nations of Eastern Europe . (Also see Gallivan, 1994.)
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the 1990s have done nothing to ameliorate Estonian fears and
suspicions of its mammoth eastern neighbor.
Also, at issue is the Estonian element of the Russian
diaspora: an ethnic Russian population, numbering some one-third
of the inhabitants of Estonia, but imperfectly assimilated into the
society. Ethnic Russians are heavily concentrated in the
northeastern quarter of Estonia and in Tallinn, the capital. Many
Russians have lived all their lives in Estonia, often as first or
second generation descendants of Russians who arrived or were
sent as industrial workers during the rule of Stalin or Khrushchev.
Russian arrivals, especially those of the Stalin era, coincided with
the forced removal of some 100 thousand ethnic Estonians, many to
death or imprisonment in Siberian gulags.
Estonian law conditions the acquisition of citizenship upon
demonstration of a basic knowledge of Estonian language. There is,
however, a significant proviso-Americans might term it a
grandfather clause-which exempts those people who were, or who
are direct descendants of, Estonian citizens before the Soviet taking
of Estonia in 1940. The effect of these enactments has been to grant
citizenship and the vote to not a few people who have lived their
lives outside the country and who do not know the language while
denying citizenship and the franchise to the substantial majority of
ethnic Russian long-term residents. In Moscow, President Boris
Yeltsin and other leaders, rhetorically assuming the role of
protectors of the Russian diaspora, have sharply inveighed against
acts such as these in Estonia and other regions of the former Soviet
periphery.

THE CONTEXT IN HISTORY
Estonian, a difficult language that is as foreign to Russians
as to English-speakers and akin only to Finnish and Hungarian
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among the languages still in use in Europe, has been the most
central element of Estonian ethnic identity from its beginning.
According to tradition, the people who would descend as Estonians
migrated from the Ural Mountains to the Baltic region around 3,500
BCE, bringing with them their distinctive tongue. From the twelfth
century until late in the twentieth, Estonians have been victims of
foreign conquest or domination, by Germans, Swedes, Poles,
Danes, and most recently by the Russians. Tsarist Russian
domination began in 1710, soon after Peter the Great had
established his nearby window on the West, St. Petersburg.
Estonian cultural nationalism and a deepening of national
feeling came with publication of Kalevipoeg, the national epic, in
the second half of the nineteenth century. Music was also to become
an important nationalist medium, beginning with the first Singing
Festival in 1869.
The World War I chaos and the advent of the Soviet state
gave Estonians their opportunity to break the Russian hold.
Declaring their independence in 1918, Estonians won Soviet
Russian recognition of that claim in the 1920 Treaty of Tartu.
Estonia experienced that first modern period of independence for
only two decades. In 1940, the Soviet Union, acting upon
agreements set forth in a secret codicil to the Nazi-Soviet NonAggression Pact of August 23, 1939, executed the forced
annexation of Estonia and the two other Baltic states, Latvia and
Lithuania. Later, when Germany and the Soviet Union went to war
against each other, Estonia fell for a time into German hands. The
Soviet reconquest of the Baltic states came in 1944, with Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania being returned to Soviet union-republican
status.
Large-scale Sovietization of Estonia and the massive
industrialization and Russification of its northeast quarter began
after World War II. Many Estonians were forced out of their
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country, and ethnic Estonians, as a proportion of the total
population, dropped from 97% in 1945 to 72% in 1953 and to 61%
by 1989.
Estonians vividly recall important events in their national
history from the Gorbachev era. On August 23, 1989, the fiftieth
anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 2.5 million Estonians ,
Latvians, and Lithuanians joined hands in an unbroken Tallinn-toVilnius chain, singing Baltic nationalist songs in soulful defiance of
Soviet central power. Estonia's second modern independence era
began two years later when in the aftermath of the failed August
1991 coup d 'etat in Moscow, a collapsing Soviet state recognized
the departure of the Baltic states from the Union.
The main feature of the years after that has been the
remarkably fast recovery of a market economy and construction of
new democratic political structures in Estonia. The citizenship issue
is far from settled, but it can be said that the processes of adaptation
and integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society are
beginning to take place.
A study of opinion in Estonia immediately preceding and
just following the 1991 recognition of independence revealed deep
cleavages based upon ethnicity. In particular, in the March 3, 1991
referendum on independence, a vote in which Soviet citizens
residing in Estonia were entitled to take part, 78 percent voted ''yes"
overall; yet, certainly no more than 25 percent of ethnic minority
voters (mostly Russians) cast ballots in favor of independence.
Non-Estonians who did vote yes were more likely than other nonEstonians to have been long-term residents of Estonia who had
learned the language and who recognized that the standard of living
was higher in Estonia than in other parts of the U.S.S.R. (Vetik,
1993).
The author of a more recent study published in 1995
contends that in Estonia rapid adaptive psychological changes ru:_:e
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occurring within the Russian community. His study data reveal that
on an increasing number of characterizing values, Russians in
Estonia are beginning to perceive a closer affinity between
themselves and the ethnic Estonians than between themselves and
the Russians of Russia; that is, Russians are coming incrementally
to identify with Estonia and Estonians (Vetik, 1995).
Another study, predicated upon the hypothesis that a new
Nordic-Baltic identity may be developing in post-Soviet Estonia,
drew respondents from three ethnic pools: Swedes, Estonians, and
Estonia-residing Russians. The resulting data show that among
respondents from all three groups there is an increase in hedonistic
orientation and more concern about personal quality of life. A
common pattern characterizing both Estonian and Russian
respondents was a decline in expressed idealism with respect to
matters such as the environment and world peace and its
replacement by consumer values. This trend hasbeen interpreted as
part of a general de-ideologization in post-Communist society
(Lauristin and Vihalemm, 1997).

METHODOLOGY
As researchers we were interested in identifying various
perspectives, or patterned attitudes, within Estonia toward Estonia
in its renewed position as an independent nation and toward its
post-Soviet liberalization. Estonia is quite extraordinary among the
world's nations (though perhaps somewhat less remarkable in the
transforming East European context) in the extent to which the
torch of political and economic leadership has already passed to its
educated young, to the first generation reaching maturity at the
close of or even after the passing of the Soviet era. As Estonian and
American political scientists, we thus focused our research upon
students at Estonian universities, respondents who are on their way
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to positions of national influence , both structurally and as opinion
leaders who will influence the development of political culture in
the nation.
We employed Q methodology, a procedure created for the
scientific study of subjectivity. Q methodology is unlike probability
sampling surveys, in which inferences are drawn about views of a
population based upon structured responses of a sample to discrete
questions. Q methodology instead allows each respondent to create
and register a model of his or her perspective by relating various
responses to each other.
Q is an approach that detemrines the major points of
agreement or disagreement-and
their relative
significance-in the population by analyzing the
responses of a rather small number of people, selected
to represent the major perspectives on an issue, to a set
of statements chosen to cover a wide range of
viewpoints (the Q-sample). Each respondent provides
a Q-sort, a ranking of [the respondent's] agreement or
disagreement with the statements. These statements
then are correlated and factor analyzed to isolate the
various common attitudes (Brown and Coke 1977, 3).2

The responses employed in this study .numbered 51
students. The sample is extraordinarily large by comparison with
most studies using Q methodology. Twenty respondents were male
and 30 female; one respondent did not indicate gender . Most of the
students were in the 18-21 age range, and none was older than 29.
Twenty-nine of the respondents were students at the University of
2

The interdisciplinary society of Q methodologists is the International Society
for the Scientific Study of Subjectivity, which publishes the journal Operant Subjectivity .
For further information about Q Methodology , see Brown 1980 and McKeown and Thomas
1990.
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Tartu (TU) , Estonia ' s venerable national university founded in
1632. Nineteen were enrolled at Tallinn Pedagogical University
(fPU) , which has become (despite the limits now inaccurately
suggested by its archaic name) Estonia ' s second comprehensive
institution of higher education . The three other respondents were
students at International College of Ecology and Technology, a
Russian-language institution at Sillamde in Estonia ' s far northeast.
Late in 1997, the International College's name was changed to the
Institute of Economics and Administration (IEA). 3
The respondents reflect, albeit imperfectly, the ethnic
diversity of contemporary Estonia. Only one of them, a woman,
indicated that she held Russian citizenship . There were, however,
eight who identified themselves as ethnic Russians and one as
Belarussian. Forty-one claimed Estonian ethnicity, and one said that
she was of mixed Estonian and English ethnic background. Three
were born outside Estonia, all three of these in Russia.
Each respondent produced a Q-sort by ranking the
statements contained in a 52-statement set. We drew these
statements from the vast literature on Estonian history; political
philosophy, culture, and economy; and international affairs. 4 Many
of these statements appear in their English form later in Appendixes
AandB.
In the field work itself, the responding students read the
statements in Estonian, with the instructions, and a request for
respondent demographic data . Respondents were asked to read

3

We thank Professor Georg Sootia ofTPU and Professor Jiri Tammaro of TU
and of !EA for their valuable assistance during the field research .
4

Q methodologists use the term concoursesto refer to broad topics or themes
that become foci of statement selection for the Q-sample. Although the Q-sample of the
present study is complex, we maintain that its statements collectively focus upon one
central concourse : respondent subjectivity toward independent democratic Estonia.
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carefully through the statements printed on 52 individual cards, and
initially to sort these into three groups: (1) statements with which
the respondent agreed, (2) statements with which he or she
disagreed, and (3) neutral statements (with which the respondent
neither agreed nor disagreed). Each respondent, following the
specifications of a forced-distribution scale, eventually assigned the
value of -5 to the three statements selected by that respondent as
most disagreeable and +5 to the three most favored statements.
Four statements were to be assigned -4 and four +4. Five
statements each were to be given values of -3, -2, -1, +l, +2, and
+3. Eight statements, toward which the respondent felt neither
disposed nor disinclined, were designated 0.

RESULTS
Through factor analysis of the Q-sort responses,5 we
derived four significant "factors": differentiated perspectives or
world views about Estonia in general, ethnic issues and issues of
political economy within Estonia, and world affairs and Estonia's
place in the international system. These perspectives have been
identified by the values conveyed by their "defining" respondents
(respondents whose responses were strongly and positively
associated with particular factors) as Efficacious Enterprisers (factor
1), Detached Naysayers (factor 2), Estonia-first Welfarists (factor
3), and Cosmopolitan Bridgers (factor 4). As indicated by the
correlation scores in Table 1, the two least similar perspectives are
the Detached Naysayers and Estonia-first Welfarists. Efficacious

5
Centroid factor analysis , with manual rotation of factors. Q Method , a program
available without cost to subscribers to the Q methodology listserve , was utilized for this
data analysis .
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Enterprisers and Estonia-first Welfarists are the factors with closest
affinity.

TABLEl
FACTOR CORRELATION SCORES
{POTENTIAL RANGE: 1.000 TO-1.000)

Factors
Factors

1

2

3

4

1
2
3

1.0000

0.2033

0.5613

0.4984

0.2033

1.0000

0.0937

0.4266

0.5613

0.0937

1.0000

0.3758

4

0.4984

0.4266

0.0375

1.0000

Factor Demographics.6
Efficacious Enterprisers (factor 1) well may constitute the
core mainstream perspective among university students in Estonia
during the late 1990s. All of the eleven students whose high-loading
responses identified them as "defining" for this factor declared that
they were ethnic Estonians. Seven were enrolled in the nation's
most prestigious university, Tartu, the remaining four attending
Tallinn Pedagogical University. Five of the eleven factor 1 respondents are men.

6

See Appendix C.
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Detached Naysayers (factor 2) bore a demographic profile
ethnically quite unlike that of factor 1; three of the definers of factor
2 identified themselves as ethnic Russians, one as Belarussian, and
only one as Estonian. All five happen to be women. Four were
students at Tartu and one at the Institute of Economics and
Administration.
Of the seven Estonia-first Welfarists (factor 3), six are
ethnic Estonians ; the seventh declared herself to be of mixed
Estonian-English ethnicity . Four were TPU students and three were
at Tartu. Three identified themselves as men and three as women;
the other factor 3 respondent did not indicate gender.
Three ethnic Estonians-one at TPU, two at Tartu-and
one ethnic Russian studying at IEA were the defining respondents
of factor 4, the Cosmopolitan Bridgers. This factor bears an even
split between male and female respondents.
Common Ground Across Factor (Perspective) Lines. 7 The
data reveal on some important propositions a convergence of
opinion across factor lines. This may be one of the most significant
findings in that it suggests a consensus on certain fundamentals that
bodes well for the continuing development of civic culture in
Estonia.
All of the factors manifest respect for Russian language
and culture and a desire to pursue friendlier relations between
Tallinn and Moscow . All deny that the contemporary Russian
population of Estonia identifies too closely with Russia, and none
of the factors deems Estonia 's Russians as complicit in past
Russian transgressions against Estonia. Every factor conveys a
resolute optimism about Estonia 's future. And despite the embrace
by Estonians, including many of the respondents , of western culture

7

See Append ix A.
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and practices, all of these factors reject in principle the adoption of
"the American way of life" as the vision for Estonia.

Factor Perspectivesin Summary8
Nevertheless, the data indicate that there are clear, in some
cases sharp, divisions of perspective on many issues about Estonia
in general and about ethnic matters, perceptions of political
economy, and viewpoints about world affairs. Table 2 summarizes
the factor dispositions across selected values.
Factor 1: Efficacious Enterprisers. The characterizing
features of this factor are (a) an enthusiastic embrace of the
Estonian political system as legitimate, responsive, and well-led
(statements 6, 8, 45, 21) and of the economic and political changes
related thereto (1, 11), together with strong interest and a personal
commitment to participation in the processes of that system (9, 16);
and (b) an unambiguous devotion to principles of individual
initiative and private enterprise (40, 51, 41, 37, 17). Factor 1
respondents tend to be patriots who desire to live their adult lives in
Estonia (23, 10, 46). They clearly endorse the Estonian language
requirement for citizenship, and tend to be disinclined to support
intermarriage across ethnic lines (28, 36, 2). Western in outlook,
factor 1 affirms Estonia's overtures for entry into the European
Union (EU) and NATO (5, 26, 7, 15, 34); yet it attests to the
positions of strategic importance achieved by the rise of Pacific
Rim nations in the emerging new world order (32).

8

See Appendix B.
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TABLE2
FACTOR DISPOSITIONS ON SELECTED VALUES

Factors

1

2

3

4

Optimism for
Estonia

High

Medium/High

High

High

Post-Soviet
Transformation

High

Low

Medium

High

Political
Interest

High

Low

High

Medium/High

Political
Allegiance

High

Low

Medium

Low/Medium

Patriotism

Medium/High

Low

High

Low

Medium

High

Medium

High

Multiethnic
Pluralism

Low

High

Low

Medium/High

Welfare State

Low

Medium

High

High

EU
Membership

High

Medium/High

Low

High

NATO
Membership

Medium/High

Medium

Low

High

Values

(Deference to)
Russian
language ,
culture
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Factor 2: Detached Naysayers. Defined for the most part
by Russo-Slavic respondents, this factor conveys (a) detachment, if
not outright alienation, from Estonian political processes (6, 45, 9,
16, 1) and (b) a sharp repudiation of ethnic policy in Estonia ,
particularly of the language requirement for citizenship(l 7, 10, 43,
28). Factor 2 alone affirms the proposition that in the post-Stalin era
Estonia actually benefitted from its status as a Soviet republic (50).
It strongly sanctions intermarriage across ethnic lines (2). The
Detached Naysayers affirm certain values associated with the social
services or welfare state (40, 51, 41). Repudiating symbols of
Estonian nationhood, this factor embraces ideals of global union
and global citizenship (23, 25, 47, 22, 27). Factor 2 posits moral
parallels between American actions as a superpower and those of
the former Soviet Union (29); however, it does countenance
Estonian entry into EU and NATO (15, 34, 7).
Factor 3: Estonia-first Welfarists. Among responding
students, the space occupied by factor 3 is furthest removed from
that possessed by factor 2 (Detached Naysayers). Factor 3
manifests, above all else, (a) a deep patriotic devotion to Estonia
and a passionate commitment to living out life there (23, 25, 1, 11,
10, 46). This is a make-our-own-way kind of nationalism that
repudiates Estonian entry into NA TO and is unenthusiastic even
about prospects of association with EU (27, 15, 7). While reviling
past · Soviet hegemony (50), factor 3 appears to react more
negatively than any of the other three factors to the growing power
and influence of the United States in Estonia and the world (52, 5,
26, 29). These Estonia-fusters inveigh against intermarriage across
ethnic lines (2). They strongly defend a knowledge of Estonian both
as criterion for citizenship and as the expected condition for
permanent residence (28, 36), and they advocate stringent
restrictions on immigration to Estonia (43). This factor manifests
strong interest in (though less than full affection for) contemporary
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Estonian politics (9, 16, 6, 45). Also characteristic of factor 3 is (b)
its embrace of the values of a social services (welfare) state (40, 51,
41, 17); this is the only factor where defining respondents identify
themselves as social democrats (37).
Factor 4: Cosmopolitan Bridgers. The distinguishing
characteristics of this factor are (a) a cosmopolitan perception , not
of Estonia standing independently and alone , but of the
international systemic context in which Estonia is rooted, and (b) an
embrace of the inclusive vision of a developing multiethnic
pluralism within the nation itself. Though pleased with post-Soviet
changes and optimistic about the nation 's future (13, 1, 11), the
Cosmopolitan Bridgers are notably passive , even partially negative ,
about patriotic symbols as well as about contemporary political
process and the alleged wealmess of Estonia's leaders (23, 25, 47, 6,
8, 21, 16). Factor 4 laments the widening gap between rich and poor
and the failure of the government to remedy problems such as these
(51, 40) . This factor alone rejects the desirability of living out the
course of one' s adult life in Estonia (46). It conveys the hope for
improved Estonian-Russian relations , expresses friendly attitudes
toward the United States, and very strongly affirms Estonia 's
aspiration for membership in international organizations such as
NATO and EU (19, 5, 29,15, 34, 7). Cosmopolitan Bridgers
strongly praise Russian language and culture, affirm intermarriages
across ethnic lines, and even express disagreement with the
Estonian language criterion for citizenship (3, 2, 28).

CONCLUSION
People not familiar with the heterogeneity, the diverse texture, of society in Estonia may be surprised that this study reveals
four distinct and comprehensible perspectives among university
students in that small nation . Many of the quarrels , as between the
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individualist free enterprisers of Factor 1 and the welfare state proponents who helped define the other factors, would be recognizable
in many other national contexts. Of considerable theoretical interest
is the discovery of two viewpoints (Detached Naysayers and
Estonia-first Welfarists) that are very dissimilar in perspective ,
markedly separated from each other on issues ranging from devotion to Estonia to commitment to building there a pluralist multiethnic nation, and each seemingly disinclined to accommodation or
comprormse.
The clearest and most logical conclusion to take from this
study must be a positive forecast for Estonia, for effective democratic processes sustained by an inclusive, participatory civic culture. Here are expressions of the educated young, of men and
women stationed for power within the structures of public life and
set to lead in the development of national opinion in the generation
ahead. Two of the factors, the Detached Naysayers and the Cosmopolitan Bridgers, represent perspectives that are in some sense
"mixed"; that is, defined by the responses both of Estonian and of
Russian participants. Each of these two reaches across ethnic
divides, boldly embracing visions of an inclusive multiethnic pluralist society and polity.
Surely as important are the significant values on which
convergence exists across all factor lines, foundational consensus
values that well may be the necessary and sufficient condition for
the continuing development and full flowering of the civic culture
in Estonia: a resolute optimism about the nation 's future; respect for
Russian language and culture, with a determination not to blame the
Russian minority for past transgressions against Estonia; and others.
There is a lesson to be learned here. Liberalizing political
and economic change in the post-Soviet era has been far from
painless-both in Estonia and throughout eastern Europe. Some
nations may not make it. Some are not making it. Estonia is making
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it. In that small Baltic nation, structures and processes have been
transformed. Values and perspectives are changing too.

APPENDIX A
Significant Convergence Propositions
Factors and Scores
Statement

1

2

3

4

3. There is much that is good and
praiseworthy about Russian language
and culture.

2

5

2

5

12. Despite the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it seems to me that Russia
must surely be regarded still today as
a great power in world affairs.

1

3

1

2

19. Because of the geographical factor, Estonia should try to seek good
relations with Russia.

5

4

2

2

13. I am pessimistic about the future
of Estonia.

-5

-3

-4

-4

24. Estonia really is far too small a
country territorially and in population
to make it on its own in the long run.

-4

-3

-5

-4

38. Russians living in Estonia identify
more with Russia than with Estonia.

-2

-3

-2

-1
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APPENDIXB

Important Issues Indicatedby the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores
Issues and Statements

1

2

3

4

1

-3

0

Human Rights Record
10. Sometimes there are violations
of human rights in Estonia.

-3

PoliticalResponsibilityand Leadership
6. As I see it, the public has little
control over what politicians do in
Estonia.

-1

3

3

5

8. The average person in Estonia
can get nowhere by talking to publie officials.

-3

-3

-3

3

45. No system of politics anywhere
will be free of corruption, but generally I think that Estonia's politicians have led this nation well in
the post-Soviet years.

3

-4

0

3

21. Often democracy does not produce strong enough leaders , and
right now a strong leader would do
much good for Estonia.

-1

-1

-2

3
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APPENDIX A
Significant Convergence Propositions
Factors and Scores
Statement

1

2

3

4

39. The Russians who live here in Estonia bear some responsibility or
blame for what Russia as a nation historically did to Estonia .

-4

-5

-1

-5

52. I favor the American way of life.

-2

-2

-4

-3

APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores
Issues and Statements

1

2

3

4

1. Change never comes without
costs. But I believe that in general
the economic, social, and political
changes in Estonia in the 1990s
have been beneficial and good .

5

-1

3

4

11. Economic reforms in Estonia
have moved too fast, causing unneeded problems for average people.

-3

-2

-2

-3
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores

1

2

3

4

9. I am not interested in political
and governmental affairs in Estonia.

-5

0

-5

-4

16. I am planning in the future to
join a political party to be able to
participate more actively in political affairs in Estonia.

1

-4

1

0

23. I become very proud when I
hear the national anthem or see the
blue, black, and white tricolors flying.

3

-1

4

0

25. When I hear or read of sharp
struggles between ethnic groups in
Rwanda or Bosnia or Northern Ireland, I think that nationalism is inhuman and unreasonable.

0

5

-3

2

0

-5

-1

-2

Issues and Statements
Politi.calInterest and Commitment

StrengthenedMilitary
4 7. The Estonian army needs to be
bigger and stronger.
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores
Issues and Statements

1

2

3

4

0

0

1

3

2

0

5

-3

-1

4

-3

2

-4

4

-4

1

Rel.igwn
48. In the future, religion will not
play an important role in Estonia.

Future Life in Estonia
46 . I would like to live the remainder of my life mainly in Estonia.

Ethnic Intermarriage
2. It would not be a problem for
me if the mother tongue of my future spouse were different from my
own.

EstonianLanguage Mandate
28. It is unjust to say to someone
who has lived his life here, "you
cannot be a citizen because you
don't know Estonian" while saying
to someone who has lived his life
in the U.S., ''you can be a citizen
because your parents are."
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores
Issues and Statements

1

2

3

36. Everyone living permanently
in Estonia should know the Estonian language.

4

2

5

-5

-1

-3

0

-2

4

-2

-4

2

-5

-4

4

Non-Citizensand the State
17. The problems of non-citizens
in Estonia should be resolved by
them without their demanding that
the Estonian state solve them.

Immigration Policy
43. I support strong restrictions on
immigration to Estonia, because
big numbers of immigrants and
refugees might pose a threat to
peace and stability.

Soviet Legacy
50. The truth is that after Stalin,
Estonians benefitted from Soviet
rule, and more than other Soviet
citizens did. That is why Estonia is
wealthier per capita than any of the
other former Soviet republics.
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores

1

2

3

4

40 . In my opinion, the state is not
responsible for individuals' welfare . Everyone should manage on
his or her own.

2

-2

-3

-5

51. It bothers me that the gap between rich and poor has widened
so much in recent years .

-2

4

5

41. The Scandinavian type restricted market would not be good
for Estonia . Estonia needs the free
market.

3

-4

-2

0

37. I personally support the social
democratic way of thinking .

-3

0

2

0

0

-3

0

-1

Issues and Statements
Enterpriseand the Social ServicesState

Russian Designs
4. It is very unlikely that at some
point during my lifetime Russia
will occupy Estonia again and destroy its independence.
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores

1

2

3

4

5. I do not think it is right for one
state to have as much strategic and
military power as the United States
has today.

-1

0

1

-1

26. However great the U.S. is materially, its cultural influence on
Estonia has been more bad than
good.

-2

-2

3

0

5

2

-3

4

3

0

4

2

1

-2

4

Issues and Statements
UnitedStates

29. Great powers always behave
like great powers. I am not much
more favorably impressed by the
U.S. than I was by the old Soviet
Union, except that America is not
next door to Estonia.

NATO and European Union
7. The benefits for
ing the European
weigh any risks or
no doubt that this
join EU.

Estonia in joinUnion far outburdens. I have
nation should

15. It is clear to me that Estonia
needs to join NATO.
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores
Issues and Statements

1

2

3

4

34. Estonia joining NATO would
be a bad idea. It would only antagonize Russia, and NATO couldn't
protect this small nation adjacent
to Russia from some future Russian move into Estonia.

-5

-4

0

-5

22. I hope to see during my lifetime the emergence of a global political union in which nations as we
now know them will still have important powers but the new global
authority will enforce world peace
and ensure the welfare of people .

0

2

2

-1

27. Considering the vast problems
of pollution, nuclear weapons, and
terrorism, I think that national sovereignty and independence is a
luxury that human beings can no
longer afford. We must begin to
identify ourselves first as citizens
of the planet Earth.

-3

3

-4

-2

Global Union and Citizenship
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APPENDIXB
Important Issues Indicated by the Factors
Factors and Factor
Scores

1

2

3

4

32. Events and developments in
Japan, China, and other nations of
East Asia are gradually shifting
strategic importance toward that
region and reducing the relative
significance globally of what happens in Europe and North America

3

1

3

0

33. Although the U.S. is now hegemonic, the New World Order will
be a bipolar system where all states
will be related to one of two big
powers

-1

0

-1

-2

Issues and Statements
New World Order
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APPENDIXC

RespondentCharacteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"RespondentMarked by X)
Factor

2

1

3

4

0.5118X

0.2421

0.0639

0.3066

0.4937

0.0919

0.3134

0.4215

0.1145

0.2531

0.3188

0.3155

0.0688

0.2353

0.0182

-0.0454

0.3908

0.2252

-0.0092

0.2089

0.3618

0.2509

0.4316

Respondentnumber,sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
1. na, na, na, TPU , Estonian
0.2333

-0.0179

2. M, 18, 1, TPU , Estonian
0.5918X
3. M, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.4399
4. F, 19, na, TPU, Estonian
0.4403
5. F, 20, 1, TPU, Russian
-0.0352
6. F, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.4147
7. M, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.6039X
8. F, 22, 2, TPU, Estonian
0.3559
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APPENDIXC

RespondentCharacteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"RespondentMarked by X)
Factor

1

2

3

4

Respondentnumber,sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
9. M, 21, 4, TPU, Estonian
0.1710

0.3196

0.2735

-0.0408

0.0850

0.3634

0.3022

0.4042

0.5376X

0.1664

0.3190

0.1292

0.2737

0.5465X

0.4317

0.2496

0.4430

0.1721

IO. M, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.3007

0.0670

11. M, 18, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.4172

0.1763

12. F, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.5403X

0.0659

13. F, 18, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.3424

0.2639

14. F, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.3596

0.2664

15. M, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.3205

-0.0637

16, F, 18, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.5107X

0.2766
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APPENDIXC
Respondent Characteristics and Scores on each Factor
(''Defining" Respondent Marked by X)
Factor
I

2

3

4

0.3214

0.4062

Respondentnumber, sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
17. F, 19, 1, TPU , Estonian
0.0878

0.3189

18. M, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
-0.0976

0.0972

0.5584X

-0.1600

0.0648

0.5291X

0.2415

0.2581

0.5062X

0.1909

0.1056

0.3619

0.4817

0.5959X

0.3469

0.1946

0.3760

19. F, 19, 1, TPU, Estonian
0.4540

20. M, 20, 1, Tartu , Estonian
0.0769

0.0636

21. F, 20, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.6285X

-0.0057

22. F, 22, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.1638

0.2572

23. M , 21, 3, Tartu , Estonian
0.1235

0.0746

24. F, 19, 2, Tartu , Estonian
0.1221

0.1768
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APPENDIXC
RespondentCharacteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"RespondentMarked by X)

Factor
1

2

3

4

0.1122

0.5483X

0.2324

0.3878

0.4433

0.0843

0.7696X

0.1528

0.1896

0.1592

0.1008

-0.0274

0.2011

0.1725

0.5990X

0.2333

Respondent number,sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
25. M, 21, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.3847

0.1748

26. M, 21, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.5725X

-0.1400

27. F, 20, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.4710

0.0559

28. M , 20, 3, Tartu , Estonian
-0.0058

-0.0505

29. M , 21, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.6189X

0.1963

30. F, 20, 3, Tartu , Estonian
0.3128

0.1538

31. F, 20, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.3247

0.5261X

32. F, 22, 3, Tartu , Estonian-English
0.3760

-0.0638
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APPENDIXC
Respondent Characteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"RespondentMarked by X)
Factor
1

2

3

4

Respondent number, sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
33. F, 20, 3, Tartu , Estonian
0.6354X

-0.1037

0.4636

-0.0291

0.1491

0.1909

0.0990

0.4851

0.2016

0.3129

0.5238X

0.0656

0.2103

-0 .0393

0.1446

0.1020

0.1126

-0 .0052

0.2181

0.0140

-0.1024

34. M, 29, 3, Tartu , Estonian
0.4823
35. F, 19, 2, Tartu, Russian
0.0349
36. F, 19, 2, Tartu, Russian
0.0726

37 . F, 20, 2, Tartu, Belarussian
-0.0096

0.5676X

38 . F, 20, 2, Tartu, Russian
0.1758

-0.0481

39 . F, 20, 2, Tartu , Russian
0.4175

0.2194

40 . F, 19, 2, Tartu, Russian
-0.1267

0.6046X
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APPENDIXC

RespondentCharacteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"RespondentMarked by X)
Factor
1

2

3

4

Respondentnumber,sex, age,
class, university,ethnicity
41. F, 18, 1, IEA, Russian
-0.0083

0.3361

-0.1842

0.5775X

42. M, 19, 1, IBA, Estonian
0.4099

0.0641

0.0433

0.4706

-0.2959

0.2274

0.1530

0.2086

-0.0531

0.1505

0.4381

0.1664

0.4777

0.0473

0.4111

0.1699

43. F, 19, 3, IBA, Russian
0.1522

0.6395X

44. F, 22, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.7462X

-0.0699

45. F, 21, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.6558X

0.0199

46. F, 19, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.3044

0.3442

47. F, 20, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.2734

0.2742

48. M, 20, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.2642

0.3595
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APPENDIXC
Respondent Characteristicsand Scores on each Factor
("Defining"Respondent Marked by X)

Factor
1

2

3

4

Respondent number, sex, age,
class, university, ethnicity
49 . M, 20, 2, Tartu, Estonian
0.7453X

0.1123

0.1419

-0.0601

0.1835

0.2192

0.2062

0.2182

50. M, 21, 3, Tartu, Estonian
0.3753

0.0946

51. M, 19, 1, Tartu, Estonian
0.3378

0.4526
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